# ANALYSIS

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## THE NATURE AND VARIETY OF THE *A PRIORI*

*By* DONALD C. WILLIAMS

THE new logical empiricism has hoped to draw the teeth of rationalism with the doctrine that *a priori* or necessary statements, pre-eminently those of logic and mathematics, are of a sort variously described as conventional, definitional, linguistic, syntactical, tautologous, analytic. They are thus compatible with every state of affairs, non-informative, and so not competitive with statements of empirical fact.

Of these descriptions, the most intelligible and plausible is that *a priori* statements are analytic or (if this is a synonym) tautologous. *Whatever is square is rectangular* is necessarily true because, as Kant said, the predicate-concept only explicates part of the content of the subject-concept. Squareness, the property connoted by "square," literally contains rectangularity, the property connoted by "rectangular". The statement in question (which we may henceforth call "N"—for "Necessary") does not assert this intrinsic connection, but it does assert something which is entailed by it. N is literally tautologous because it names rectangularity twice, once in company and once by itself. On the other hand, *All books are rectangular* (henceforth to be called "C") is only contingently true, because it is synthetic. The property of bookiness, connoted by "books," does not include rectangularity, but only happens to be regularly associated with the latter in its instances.

If this is all that our empiricists mean, their doctrine is, I think, true, but it is not new, and it has been woefully confused with other, incompatible notions, and credited with consequences which itdoes not have.

(1) If N is an analytic proposition, it can be in no intelligible sense a *convention*, for a convention is a habitual mode of behaviour, and a proposition is not. The uttering of a proposition might be a habitual mode of behaviour, but analytic propositions are uttered rather less habitually than synthetic. The word "rule," which is often used in this context, sometimes means the same as "convention," and is similarly inapplicable. Sometimes, however, it means a description of a convention, and sometimes a command or resolve to observe a convention.

(2) If N is an analytic proposition, it cannot be a *description* of a convention, either realized or resolved upon, because descriptions of conventions are synthetic. The description of a verbal convention, a linguistic rule, is a definition. In the formulas for a pure uninterpreted logistic system (a very rare and peculiar thing), there occur connectional definitions which are syntactical descriptions of the symbolic substitutions permitted by the system. These are of the form: "*A*" *is substitutable for* "*B*", where the quotation-marks are of the essence of the statement, because neither sign has any independent semantical meaning. In the description of a genuine language, however (English, for example), there occur only applicative definitions which describe the semantical meaning of words. These are of the form "*A*" *is used to mean B*, where "*A*", still in quotes, is an expression, but *B*, without quotes, is a thing or property. Both sorts of definition are synthetic. To suppose otherwise is to accept the view, abhorrent to empiricists, that there is an intrinsic and necessary connection between a symbol and its use. "*Square*" *is substitutable for* "*equilateral rectangle*," is not a genuine definition, but it is a true synthetic statement. "*Square*" *means equilateral rectangle* is a genuine definition, a true synthetic statement about the word "square." But *A square is an equilateral rectangle* is not a definition, but an analytic statement about squares, and so, of course, is its implicate, *Whatever is square is rectangular*.

(3) If N is a proposition, it cannot be a command or a resolve, because commands and resolves are not propositions. Just what they are is rather more obscure than what the *a priori* is. The utterance of any proposition perhaps involves some imperative element: *Use words as I do! Believe what I say!* But this is no more true of N than of C.

(4) A milder expression of the conventionalistic doctrine is that N is, not a convention, nor the statement of one, nor the command to observe one, but *dependent* on convention ; more strictly, its truth depends on conventions or on the way in which words are used. Now, if we insist that N is a proposition, in the old-fashioned sense, it and its truth cannot depend on verbal usage because it does not contain words. If it is a sentence, however, its truth indubitably does depend on verbal usage, but so does the truth of C. " Books are rectangular " is true if " books " is being used in the ordinary way, false if it is being used to mean melons.

(5) Finally, it might be claimed that whereas both N and C depend for their truth on verbal convention, N depends wholly while C depends only partly. This claim is often equated with the assertion that to know the truth of N one needs only know the meaning of its words (" its truth is deducible from definitions "), while to know the truth of C one must know both the meaning of its words and something about further states of affairs. In a certain sense, this latter assertion is true, but in this sense it is not equivalent to the former. To know the meanings of the words in a sentence, deliberately and self-consciously, is to contemplate the properties which they connote. Since bookiness and rectangularity are connected only extrinsically, we can know the truth of C only by inspecting their instances as well as contemplating the essences. But squareness and rectangularity are connected intrinsically, and in contemplating them we can hardly miss their connection, and so learn the truth of N without recourse to instances. In either case, however, the truth of the statement depends primarily on a connection among what is meant, and only incidentally on the convention which determines the mode of expression of this connection.

It is quite true that one can test the a-priority of a statement, such as *All men are mortal*, by asking oneself, " If I found something, human in other respects, but not mortal, would I call it a ' man ' ? " but only because this is a good device to concentrate attention on the property which one has been connoting by " man." Whatever may be said of Wittgenstein's view, Lewis's view of the *a priori* is thus not justly described as permitting " truth by fiat," or as supplanting the notion of truth with the notion of *convenience*. All that fiat or convenience can determine

is whether and how we shall symbolize the truth, not the truth itself, and it does this equally for N and for C. Needless to say, necessary truth is not more amenable to our convenience, but less. Man will steer the earth out of her orbit before he will change the last least decimal of $\pi$.

Some of the persons who have claimed that the truth of N depends wholly on rules of language have no doubt laboured under the misapprehension that such rules are connectional or syntactical definitions. If the latter were the case, N might simply be one of those dispositions of symbols, like an arrangement of chessmen, which are prescribed by the rules of the game. That it is not the case, we have already seen. The words in N have their semantical or applicative meaning, just as do the words in C, and whatever special connection subsists among the words, either of N or of C, is derivative of the connection among what they mean.

If the admissibility of N had been wholly dependent on verbal rules, N would have been really meaningless, not a sentence, but a gambit, and some philosophers would so describe it. Surely, however, only the most obstinate attempt to construct *a priori* a " consistent empiricism " could blind anybody to the plain empirical fact that we understand N as well as we understand C, in essentially the same way—and Spinozists would say, much better.

If N were meaningless, it could not, strictly speaking, be *true* ; but conversely, being meaningful, it can be true ; and it is true. Ducasse would say, I believe, that it is just its truth which is necessary. The kind of fact to which N corresponds is somewhat different from the kind of fact to which C corresponds, but they correspond in very much the same way.

Persons who would still deny that N can be true, must do so on the ground that it " says nothing about the world," and is " compat ble with any state of affairs."

Now, in the principal sense in which N says nothing about the world, any general proposition, C, for instance, says nothing about the world. That is, it is hypothetical. Asserting a connection among properties or universals, it cannot assert the existence of any particular fact. But if we know from other sources that there are square things, and books, we can use N just as well as C to deduce that there are rectangular things.

Furthermore, both N and C are negatively existential. N implies that there cannot exist any non-rectangular squares, C that there do not exist any non-rectangular books.

The criticism that N, unlike C, is " compatible with any state of affairs " or " rules out no state of affairs " is just bogus. True, it does not rule out any *possible* state of affairs, but this is simply to say that it is itself a necessary truth, and *eo ipso* rules out only what is *im*possible. The ordinary truth-table or matrix method of showing the " emptiness " of logical principles is similarly fraudulent. Only logically possible combinations are shown on the table ; all the elimination which logical principles could do they have already done. Many characterizations of necessary propositions which are supposed to establish the extreme conventionalistic theory—" could not conceivably be falsified," " incapable of being contradicted by any possible experience," " incapable of being justified or refuted by facts " —thus do not support any theory at all, for they are merely other ways of saying that necessary propositions are necessary.

The only remaining sense in which I can conceive that analytic statements say nothing about the world is simply that they are analytic. What an analytic statement says differs from what a synthetic statement says in just the way which we have been exhibiting : specifically, it says something about the intrinsic connections of properties, predicates, or universals. Such a statement cannot be singular or existential, and can never by itself imply anything except more analytic statements. The rationalistic attempt to deduce the nature of things from self-evident axioms is thus sufficiently discredited. But analytic statements do convey their own peculiar kind of information, which, however little we might have expected it, seems to be sometimes extremely valuable.

Even persons who have admitted the meaning and truth of necessary statements have sometimes jibbed at admitting the meaningfulness of their denials, that is, of impossible statements. I think, however, that we must in consistency admit that an impossible statement, e.g., " Some squares are not rectangular," is meaningful and necessarily false. The reasons for this are manifold. (1) It is hard to see how N can be meaningful if its denial is not. (2) The theoretical analysis of meaning convinces me that ~N should be just as intelligible as N or C, and (3)

empirical introspection indicates that it is. (4) An impossible proposition is self-contradictory, not in that it need itself be of the form $p. \sim p$, but in that it entails a proposition of that form; but a muddle of marks without meaning could neither contradict itself nor entail anything. The meaning is what is contradictory and impossible. If $\sim N$ is to be called "absurd", "nonsense", "inconceivable", these words must therefore be taken in their workaday sense, to mean impossible or incredible, not actually meaningless. Strictly, impossible statements are not always even incredible, in the literal sense of being such that they cannot be believed. It is a commonplace of postulational theory that the inconsistency of postulates may appear only after a long deductive process, while some very thoughtful persons have through whole lifetimes devoutly believed self-contradictory propositions : that the circle can be squared, for instance, or the doctrine of transubstantiation.

If the preceding reflections have any value, it can hardly lie in their novelty, but only in clearing away some rather transparent errors and irrelevancies, to bring us to grips with the important problems which pertain to the *a priori*. Our exemplar N, for instance, has been a rather shabby and prosaic specimen. Will the same sort of considerations apply to the whole luxuriant variety of *a priori* statements? How literally can we make them all out to be "analytic"? What is the nature of the apparent primacy among them of the principles of logic?

Consider the following statements : (1) All rectangles are rectangles ; (2) All rectangles are rectangular ; (3) All equilateral rectangles are rectangular ; (4) All squares are rectangular ; (5) All the brave are courageous ; (6) All horses are animals ; (7) What is red is not blue ; (8) Virtue is not blue ; (9) Saturday is not in bed ; (10) A man cannot be his own father ; (11) If John is taller than Mary, Mary is shorter than John ; (12) Pink is more like red than black ; (13) 6 is between 5 and 7 ; (14) Whatever is scarlet is red ; (15) Being red entails being coloured ; (16) If anything is coloured, it is extended ; (17) If all men are mortal, no immortal being is a man ; (18) $43 \times 56 = 2408$ ; (19) Awe is fear and love; (20) $p \sim p. \supset .q$ ; (21) Numbers are properties of classes ; (22) The diagonal of a square is not commensurable with its side.

Some of these are apparently trivial, some are recondite ;

some are familiar in one context, some in others, some seem too silly for any. But they are all fundamentally alike, I think, in conforming essentially to the characteristics we have been describing. In general, they are necessary and *a priori*. More specifically, they are concerned with properties or universals *as such*, some of them structural universals, or forms, some of them qualities. (In the traditional terminology, they are all subsistential or essential propositions.) More specifically still, they are *analytic* in that they deal with intrinsic connections or internal relations of these universals. Some of them, finally—1 to 6, for instance, and 19— are plainly analytic in the most literal sense: the connection they assert is one of conjunctive inclusion of one property in another. But although this last and most helpful diagnosis is conceivable for 15 or 18, it is very difficult for some of the others, such as 10 or 20. Exactly what constitutes genuine analyticity, and how far it is illuminated by the notions of inclusion and entailment, and these by each other, are the most fundamental questions in the theory of logic. For the time being we can in large part only trust our "intuitions" to single out analytic statements, and my intuition recommends that the analysis of analyticity proceed on the tentative assumption that statements of all the above varieties are analytic in the same significant sense, and that the nature of analyticity is writ plainest, at any rate, in 3 and in the corresponding formal principle, $PQ \supset P$.

Most of the distinctions which philosophers have drawn among our exhibits are, I think, plainly factitious, the products of typographical suggestion, psychological custom, and logical specialization. The person who asserts that they are all conventions is nearer right than the person who asserts that some are and some are not. The first three *seem* in a different category from the rest, partly because their truth is so idiotically obvious, and partly because their words happen to repeat themselves in such a way that a person could tell they are analytic even if he did not know their meaning. Sentences 4, 5 and 6 are almost as obvious, and can easily be provided with spurious connectional definitions to make their analyticity symbolically apparent also. Many logicians have cried down sentences 1 to 6 as merely "verbal propositions", if not sheer senseless rigmarole, and contrasted them with "real" *a priori* propositions, just as some

logicians condemn 17 as a mere " verbal transformation ", and contrast it with " real " entailments. Others would denominate sentences 1 to 6 the only genuinely analytic statements, and distinguish the rest variously as intuitive inductions, elucidatory analyses, synthetic *a priori* propositions, entailments, and demonstrata, and would perhaps segregate the mathematical and logical examples as *sui generis*. I think it is clear now, however, that the mere obviousness of sentences 1 to 6, and 17, is irrelevant to any important logical issue, and so is the fact that they display verbally their analyticity. The relation between elucidatory analysis and analytic propositions, on the other hand, is a delicate question which I must here avoid,[1] but analyses do eventuate in analytic propositions of the sort we have described. Both analysis and intuitive induction seem to be exactly the process of ascertaining the content and intrinsic connections of predicates, properties, or universals. Their rôle in the establishment of sentences 1 to 6 is overlooked only because they are there so easy and rapid, and is overlooked with regard to 20 and 22 only because here they are so difficult and delayed. The designations " metaphysical " and " synthetic *a priori* " can be justified, if at all, only as antidotes to pure conventionalism.

Sentences 7, 8, 9, 10 and 22 are negative, and express necessary or intrinsic *dis*connections. Of these, 8 and 9 are peculiar in coming within the jurisdiction of the theory of types, as does 21. Most adherents of the theory would aver that both " Virtue is blue " and " Virtue is not blue " are senseless, but so far as I can see, this doctrine is only a variety of the generally erroneous view that tautologies and contradictions are meaningless. " Virtue is blue," like " Squares are not rectangular," is to be rejected *a priori*, not because there are antecedent formation-rules which forestall it, but because the properties which its words connote are intrinsically incapable of the relation which its grammatical form connotes. In other words, it is an impossible proposition, and its denial, " Virtue is not blue," is, or stands for, a necessary one. The impropriety of " Virtue is blue " must be sharply distinguished from that of phrases like " Down ambidexterous very," which is really meaningless as a whole because its words are not arranged in any of the standard meaningful ways, so that

[1] I have treated of it in " Analysis, Analytic Propositions, and Real Definitions," *Analysis*, 3, 1936, pp. 75–80.

it says nothing about the connections of their possible significata ; and both must be distinguished from genuine grammatical error, which is the same superficial sort of mistake as the mispronunciation of a word.

The analysis of analyticity, we may surmise, is closely bound up with the discovery of the precise difference between ordinary run-of-the-mill analytic statements and the principles of logic. It can already be said with confidence that the principles of logic, being genuinely analytic propositions, are not conventions or creatures of convention. Furthermore, although we can invent artificial systems of logistic *ad infinitum*, whatever postulates, definitions, formation rules and transformation rules we lay down, with whatever language or metalanguage we operate, their consequences are what they are, irrespective of convention and convenience, by the one inescapable sort of necessity. The only sense in which there are whole plural logics is simply, I think, that different sets of consequents follow from different abstract premises. The only sense in which, as the physicalists assert,[2] we can change piecemeal the consequents of any statement, is that whereas a sentence like " Books are rectangular " has one set of consequents on the ordinary interpretation, it has another set if somebody uses it as a code-phrase for, e.g., *If the enemy attempt to evacuate, we shall attack at once.*

It is tempting to suppose that logic is the system of all the most general principles which describe the forms of all necessary propositions. " I call a proposition ' analytic ' ," says Russell,[3] " when it follows from the laws of logic," and we familiarly identify *a priori* necessity with *logical* necessity. *All equilateral rectangles are rectangular* is thus logically necessary, but it is not a principle of logic. It is, however, a special case of $PQ \supset P$, and the latter is a principle of logic. Unfortunately, it is not easy to pick out formal principles for all our *a priori* sentences. Is there, for instance, a set of logical principles for every relation ? Thus the principle of 11 might be : $(x, y) : T(x, y). \supset . S(y, x)$—where " $T$ " stands for *taller than* and " $S$ " for *shorter than*. Most logicians would reject this as too " material," but would accept the still more general principle : $(x, y, R) : xRy. \supset . y\breve{R}x$ —where " $R$ " stands for any relation, and " $\breve{R}$ " for its

[2] Hempel, for instance, *Analysis*, 2, pp. 94–5.
[3] " Verification," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1937–1938, p. 1.

converse. Some odour of hocuspocus hangs about the latter business, however, and even more about the attempt to formalize 15, for instance, by some such scheme as: $(x, n, S)$. $S^n x \supset Sx$—where "$S$" by itself stands for a determinable property, and "$S$" with a superscript stands for a determinate value of it. It is hard to concoct any formula for 12 and 16 at all.

Although it is false that all or any large proportion of analytic statements are about language, and although many analytic statements about language are not principles of logic (*Every sentence has a verb*, for instance), it may well be that all logical principles are analytic statements about language, viz., about certain abstract forms and functions of language. Finally, we must consider the specialist's suggestion, somewhat arbitrary at present, that logic just is the system of all principles which explicate the properties of the fundamental logical constants: $\vee$ and $\sim$, say, or, more plausibly, $\subset$ and $\hat{x}$.[4] Whether these constants are themselves linguistic or extra-linguistic I do not try to decide.

[4] The first pair, originally the primitives of *Principia Mathematica*, are named as definitive of logic by Hahn, *Mathematik und Naturerkennen*, p. 16. On the second, cf. Quine, *Journal of Symbolic Logic*, 2, 1937, pp. 145–152. Tarski, *Actes du Congrès International de Philosophie Scientifique*, 1935, still declines to propose a criterion.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE.

Substantial representatives of the pragmatic and positivistic theory of the *a priori* are: Lewis, *Mind and the World-Order*; Wittgenstein, *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*; Hahn, *Mathematik und Naturerkennen*; Carnap, *The Logical Syntax of Language*; Reichenbach, *Experience and Prediction*; Ayer, *Language, Truth, and Logic*; Stebbing, 'Symposium: The *A Priori*' (II), *Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol.* 12, 1933, pp. 178–197. My amendment to the positivistic theory would align it more nearly with that of Russell in *The Problems of Philosophy*, and so with the older view that *a priori* knowledge concerns the relations of "concepts" or "meanings." Essays on a similar principle, but inclined for the most part to limit it unduly, one way or another, have been made by: Davies, '*A Priori* Concepts,' *Analysis*, 2, 1934, pp. 20–23; Britton, 'Empirical Foundation for Logic,' *ibid.*, pp. 37–42; Bronstein, 'What is Logical Syntax?' *Analysis*, 3, 1936, pp. 49–56; Ruja, 'The Logic of Logical Positivism,' *Journal of Philosophy*, 1936; Broad, Porteous, and Jackson, 'Symposium: Are There Synthetic *A Priori* Truths?' *Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol.* 15, 1936, pp. 102–155; Berlin, 'Symposium: Induction and Hypothesis' (III), *Arist. Soc. Supp. Vol.* 16, 1937, pp. 63–102; Ryle, 'Categories,' *Proc. Arist. Soc.*, 1937–1938, pp. 189–206; M. Kneale, 'Logical and Metaphysical Necessity,' *ibid.* pp. 253-268; and various writers on "entailment".

In speaking so substantivally of properties, predicates, or universals I offend against the naïve nominalism characteristic of our day. Nominalism impresses me as a singularly transcendental and incredible metaphysics, but if it is ever made plausible, our account of the *a priori* could doubtless be translated into its terms without loss of identity.

I have made no bones about speaking of "facts," and even of facts about universals, and analytic facts. My only defence, I am afraid, is the facts themselves. In using "semantical" for a word's reference to extra-linguistic facts, and "syntactical" for its logistic connections with other words, I am accepting the usage of Morris, *Foundations of the Theory of Signs*.

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# REPLY TO MR. DUNCAN-JONES[1]

*By* A. M. MacIver

I AM afraid that Mr. Duncan-Jones is being a little pedantic, in the sense of demanding greater precision than a particular context requires. All that my argument required was that the proposition expressed by a sentence in the first person should always be in principle expressible by a sentence in the third person. There was no need for the examples I used to be more than suggestive, to induce readers to reflect that, if this were done with sentences of such forms as "*p* but I don't think *p*," it would be seen that they did not express contradictions. Since it is quite possible that Mussolini should be having a bath at a time when Mr. Duncan-Jones did not think that he was, it follows that, if Mr. Duncan-Jones were to say "Mussolini is having a bath but I don't think he is", he would be asserting a proposition that was not self-contradictory. This seems to me to be one of those points which are quite obvious when attended to and yet so often neglected as to lead to common philosophical muddles, and I am sorry that Mr. Duncan-Jones should sidetrack the discussion into the irrelevant question (however interesting in itself) how far sentences of different grammatical forms can exactly coincide in meaning.

But there is one thing which I should like to point out about this, and that is that we get different answers to the question what proposition such-and-such a sentence expresses, according as we consider the sentence purely in itself or as used in a given context.[2] Take one of Mr. Duncan-Jones's examples, the sentence "Professor Moore lives in Cambridge". Of course this has no meaning at all apart from the conventions of some language—when Mr. Duncan-Jones speaks of the properties which symbols possess "in themselves" (his inverted commas), I presume that he must mean the properties which belong to them by convention, as distinguished from those attributed to them in use on a particular occasion—but the meaning which belongs to it merely by the conventions of the English language

[1] See A. M. MacIver, 'Some questions about "know" and "think",' *Analysis* 5, 3 and 4 (May 1938), pp. 43–50, and Austin E. Duncan-Jones, 'Further questions about "know" and "think"', *Analysis* 5, 5 (August 1938), pp. 74–83.

[2] The *systematic* dependence of meaning on context which we find in *pronominal* sentence-forms is something over and above what I am discussing here.

is much vaguer than that which may be understood from it when addressed by a particular speaker to a particular hearer. All that it represents purely by the conventions of the language is the very general proposition that somebody of the rank of professor and name of Moore lives in some place called Cambridge (of which I find nine in the index of my atlas). From the sentence as used by Mr. Duncan-Jones any reader of *Analysis* will understand a much more definite proposition than this, but only because we know something about Mr. Duncan-Jones (namely that he is a British philosopher of the first half of the twentieth century) and something about contemporary philosophy. In other circumstances the same sentence (that is, another token of the same sentence-type) might convey the quite different proposition that some American professor of the name of Moore lived in Cambridge, Massachusetts.

When Mr. Duncan-Jones talks about " the proposition which a sentence expresses ", he clearly does not mean the very general proposition which it represents purely conventionally; he means the much more definite proposition which it would convey in some supposed circumstances. He is saying that there are circumstances in which what would be conveyed by " I live in Cambridge ", even if the speaker was Professor Moore (that is, the particular Professor Moore to whom Mr. Duncan-Jones is referring), would not be the same proposition as would be conveyed by " Professor Moore lives in Cambridge " or " The editor of *Mind* lives in Cambridge ". For example, the hearer might not know that the speaker was Professor Moore, or that Professor Moore was editor of *Mind*. But we can also suppose circumstances in which each of these sentences would convey the same proposition as either of the others. Suppose I have been introduced to Professor Moore and then hear him say " I live in Cambridge " ; what I shall then understand will be just what I should understand if someone else said " Professor Moore lives in Cambridge ". Or suppose that a man has been pointed out to me as the editor of *Mind* but I do not know what his name is or anything else about him ; what I shall then understand if I hear him say " I live in Cambridge " will be just what I should understand if I heard someone else say " The editor of *Mind* lives in Cambridge ". Or suppose I know that Professor Moore is the editor of *Mind* but know nothing else about him ; then what I

shall understand from " Professor Moore lives in Cambridge " will be just what I should understand from " The editor of *Mind* lives in Cambridge ".

I believe that, if Mr. Duncan-Jones had observed this, he would never have thought that his arguments were valid against my paper. For, if there are any circumstances in which one sentence would convey the same proposition as another sentence, then, if the proposition conveyed by one of those sentences is obviously self-consistent, the proposition conveyed by the other cannot be self-contradictory. The fact that the same sentences in other circumstances might convey different propositions is simply irrelevant. In my paper I took certain circumstances for granted. Of course " Mr. Braithwaite went to Grantchester on February 14th, 1938 " would only convey the same proposition as " I went to Grantchester yesterday " to a hearer who knew that the latter was spoken by Mr. Braithwaite on February 15th, 1938. The point is that in those circumstances (which I took for granted) the same proposition would be conveyed by either sentence. The consequences which I drew then follow (or at least it has not yet been shown that they don't).

University of Leeds,
September 1938.

## THE ANALYSIS SOCIETY

The postponed meeting will be held in London on 7 and 8 January, 1939. The subject for discussion will be 'Philosophical aspects of dialectical materialism'. Members of the Society are invited to submit papers on this subject, for presentation at the meeting and publication in one of the forthcoming numbers of *Analysis*. Papers by non-members will also be considered. Intending contributors are asked to communicate with the editor of *Analysis* without delay, and are reminded that papers should be as short as possible.

IMPORTANT CORRECTION. This meeting was wrongly announced in the last number of *Analysis* as taking place on 8 and 9 January.